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AbstractRegulatory competition in company law has been extensively debated in the last few decades, but it has rarely been discussed whether there could also be regulatory competition in partnership law. This article fills this gap. It addresses the partnership law of the US, the UK, Germany, and France, and presents empirical data on the different types of partnerships and companies established in these jurisdictions. The main focus is on the use of a limited liability partnership (LLP) outside its country of origin. It is also considered whether some regulatory competition can take place in the law of limited partnerships.

Leaving aside cases of overt discrimination and interventions aimed at favouring certain firms or modes of production, legislative and regulatory provisions may have such an impact on costs and prices that it will be necessary to consider with the greatest care whether, either by virtue of their own impact or by reason of disparities between two or more countries, some of them may have the effect of distorting conditions of competition among the national economies as a whole or in particular branches of economic activity … But at the same time it will be necessary to identify very precisely the limits of whatever action is necessary, and to dispel certain misunderstandings …

Our understanding of international competition in regulatory policies has not progressed much because conventional theories lead to a bewildering range of conclusions. Empirical evidence has shown the limitations of simplistic models. Fresh work should overcome the obsession with 'races' and 'final outcomes' of conventional theoretical approaches and start modelling real-world mechanisms of regulatory competition. The first part of the article shows the limitations of conventional theories. The second introduces eight problems that explanations of international regulatory competition should address. It also discusses how the articles presented here contribute to the solution to problematic aspects of the puzzle. The conclusion reports results achieved in terms of key concepts of regulatory competition, sequences of cooperation and competition, the role of non-unitary actors in networked regulatory action, and why regulatory competition is still limited, both in the EU and in transatlantic relations.

Examines international competition in regulatory policies; focus on environmental policy, EU asylum policy, transatlantic trade, and economic cooperation and competition; 6 articles. Contents: The puzzle of regulatory competition, by Claudio M. Radaelli; Competition and cooperation in environmental policy: individual and interaction effects, by Katharina Holzinger and Christoph Knill; European markets and national regulation: conflict and cooperation in British competition policy, by Nikolaos Zahariadis; Taking legal rules into consideration: EU asylum policy and regulatory competition, by Ségolène Barbou des Places; In whose interest? pressure group politics, economic competition and environmental regulation, by Thomas Bernauer and Ladina Caduff; Trading up in the transatlantic relationship, by Sebastiaan Princen.

This paper studies theoretically and empirically competition in commodity taxation and product market regulation between trading partner countries. We present a two-country general equilibrium model in which destination-based commodity taxes finance public goods, and product market regulation affects both the number of firms in the market and product diversity. We provide empirical evidence based on data for 21 OECD countries over the 1990-2008 period. Our results suggest that commodity taxation and product market regulation are interdependent policies. We find absence of strategic interaction in commodity taxation between governments. Furthermore, we show that domestic regulation has a negative effect on domestic commodity taxation. Finally, we demonstrate that product market regulation is a strategic complementary policy.

This paper studies competition in commodity taxation and product market regulation between trading partners. To explain the strategic interaction between governments and regulators, we present a two-country general equilibrium model in which destination-based commodity taxes finance public goods and product market regulation affects the number of firms in the market. We provide empirical evidence based on data for 21 OECD countries over the 1990-2008 period. Our results suggest that commodity taxation and product market regulation are interdependent policies. We confirm the absence of strategic interaction in commodity taxation between governments. Finally, we show that domestic regulation has a negative effect on domestic commodity taxation and that product market regulation is a strategic complement policy.

This paper studies competition in commodity taxation and product market regula- tion between trading partner countries. We present a two-country general equilibrium model in which destination-based commodity taxes finance public goods, and prod- uct market regulation affects both the number of firms in the market and product diversity. We provide empirical evidence based on data for 21 OECD countries over the 1990-2008 period. Our results suggest that commodity taxation and product mar- ket regulation are interdependent policies. Theoretically and empirically we find an absence of strategic interaction in commodity taxation between governments. Further- more, we show that domestic regulation has a negative effect on domestic commodity taxation. Finally, we demonstrate theoretically and show empirically that product market regulation is a strategic complementary policy.